China has long been a net importer of cotton, but the claim that it "exports large quantities of Xinjiang raw cotton" does not match the real trade structure—what goes overseas on a large scale is cotton yarn, fabric, garments, and other finished cotton products, while raw cotton exports are extremely small. In 2025, China's exports of cotton-related products totaled about 5,400 tons, of which cotton not carded or combed accounted for about 4,406 tons; in the same year, cotton imports reached 1.07 million tons, more than 200 times the volume of raw cotton exports. This means the premise that "China lacks cotton yet sells millions of tons of Xinjiang raw cotton abroad" does not hold up.

Key Points

  • In 2025, China imported about 1.07 million tons of cotton (down 59.1% year-on-year), while raw cotton exports were only about 4,406 tons, making imports more than 200 times exports.
  • In 2025, national cotton output was 6.641 million tons, with Xinjiang contributing 6.165 million tons, about 93%; domestic consumption in the same period was about 7.7 million tons, leaving a gap of millions of tons between production and demand.
  • The cotton import tariff quota for both 2025 and 2026 is 894,000 tons (state trading accounts for 33%), and for 2026 an additional 300,000 tons of out-of-quota preferential-tariff processing trade quota has been arranged.

The so-called "annual import of 2 million tons of cotton" is a fixed misreading. Customs data show that China imported about 2.62 million tons of cotton in 2024, falling to about 1.07 million tons in 2025, down 59.1% year-on-year, and about 1.03 million tons in the first seven months of 2026. Import volumes fluctuate sharply with domestic output, inventories, prices, and textile demand, rather than being a fixed annual gap of 2 million tons; Ministry of Commerce monitoring also shows that in the first four months of 2025 imports were only 400,000 tons, down 71.1% year-on-year, against the backdrop of high earlier imported cotton inventories combined with increased domestic supply. Imports are more like a regulating valve.

The root of the "Xinjiang cotton export" impression is that three concepts are conflated: raw cotton produced in Xinjiang, cotton yarn and fabric processed from Xinjiang cotton, and the garments and home textiles ultimately exported. Seed cotton is ginned into lint, then spun, woven, dyed, printed, cut, and sewn before becoming exportable finished clothing. China's real advantage is not "shipping cotton abroad," but keeping cotton within a vast industrial chain for further processing.

The second reason for imports lies in cotton blending needs. Cotton from different producing areas differs markedly in fiber length, strength, maturity, fineness, and color; high-count shirt fabrics, denim, and ordinary towels have different raw material requirements; spinning mills usually blend cotton from different origins, grades, and prices according to orders to control strength, uniformity, and cost. The third reason is price: when international cotton prices plus freight and tariffs remain competitive, firms naturally import, and when domestic supply is ample and prices are suitable, imports quickly fall back. The state has long applied quota management: the total tariff quota for both 2025 and 2026 is 894,000 tons, of which 33% is state trading quota; for 2026, an additional 300,000 tons of out-of-quota preferential-tariff processing trade import quota is arranged, explicitly intended to secure cotton for textile firms' processing trade. What is imported is low-value raw material; what is exported is high-value-added finished product.

On the other side, Xinjiang cotton is the absolute mainstay of domestic supply. Of the national output of 6.641 million tons announced by the National Bureau of Statistics for 2025, Xinjiang accounted for 6.165 million tons, about 93%; the China Cotton Association estimates domestic consumption in 2024/25 at about 7.7 million tons. When domestic brands emphasize using Xinjiang cotton, they are first conveying information about raw material origin and supply chains, which is not logically in conflict with whether cotton is imported. More noteworthy is Xinjiang's position in the industrial chain: in the first four months of 2025, Xinjiang's yarn output was about 1.09 million tons, and processing capacity is still expanding. Whether value can remain local matters more than whether cotton crosses borders.

Expanding planting to replace imports is constrained by land and water resources—growing cotton means not simultaneously growing wheat, corn, or oilseeds. In 2025, Xinjiang's cotton yield was 158.6 kg per mu, versus about 74 kg in the Yangtze River basin and about 82.7 kg in the Yellow River basin; this gap is determined jointly by climate, scale, and mechanization; retaining a moderate amount of imports can also diversify supply risks from extreme weather, prices, and logistics fluctuations. For a country with the world's largest textile manufacturing sector, what determines returns is not whether a ton of cotton is imported, but who turns it into a higher-value commodity.

Source: Why does China need to import 2 million tons of cotton every year yet export large amounts of Xinjiang cotton?_Tencent News · Originally published 2026-09-29